Redesigning Global Trade Institutions by Linarelli, John
Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
2011 
Redesigning Global Trade Institutions 
John Linarelli 
Touro Law Center, jlinarelli@tourolaw.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, International Economics Commons, International Law 
Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Transnational Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
18 Sw. J. INT'l L. 75 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
REDESIGNING GLOBAL TRADE INSTITUTIONS 
John Linarelli1 
We are at what might be the most propitious moment for change in 
international trade institutions since Bretton Woods. After seven years, the 
Doha Round stalled in July 2008.2 While multilateral negotiations faltered, 
bilateral and regional trade agreements proliferated, in what have become 
known as a “spaghetti bowl of crisscrossing arrangements.”3 To date, 474 
regional trade agreements have been notified to the WTO, with 283 in 
force.4 While regionalism seems to be becoming dominant as the approach 
of choice for states to pursue their trade policies, a number of proposals to 
reform and improve the WTO have been put on the table,5 with one of the 
latest at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2011 suggesting a 
radical change in the way the WTO system operates.6  
 All of this momentum for change comes at a time when the world has 
changed a great deal even since the Uruguay Round.7 The Bretton Woods-
Geneva-Havana triad of negotiations seems so far in the distant past.8 
1 Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of La Verne 
College of Law. Many thanks to comments received during the presentation of my ideas 
for this essay at the 2020 conference.  
2 See Carla A. Hills, The Stakes of Doha: Jump-Starting a Stalled Process __ FOREIGN
AFFAIRS __.  
3 Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low, Introduction, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM:
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 1-10, 1 (Richard Baldwin & Partick Low 
eds. Cambridge University Press 2009). 
4 351 regional trade agreements were notified to the WTO under GATT 1947/1994 Article 
XXIV, 31 under the Enabling Clause, and 92 under GATS Article V. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/region e htm (last visited March 10, 2011. 
See Theresa Carpenter, A Historical Perspective on Regionalism,” in MULTILATERALIZING
REGIONALISM, supra note 3, at 13. 
5 Bernard Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment, World Bank 
Policy Research Paper No. 5525, Jan. 2011. 
6  GLOBAL REDESIGN: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN A MORE
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (Richard Samans, Klaus Schwab, & Mark Malloch-Brown eds. 
2010 World Economic Forum), http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-redesign-
initiative/index html (last visited March 6, 2011 
7 The Uruguay Round had its official start in September 1986 in Punta del Este Uruguay 
and concluded with the signing of the Uruguay Round agreements, which, among other 
things, established the WTO, on April 15, 1995 in Marrakesh Morocco. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact5 e htm (last visited March 6, 
2011). 
8 It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss Bretton Woods, Geneva, and Havana 
negotiations in detail. At the 1944 conference at Bretton Woods the International Monetary 
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Global economic power is becoming more distributed, with fast developing 
countries such as China and India, and the middle-income countries of Asia, 
emerging as growing economic forces to contend with the slow growing 
economies of the United States, the European Union, and Japan.9 Trade 
policy is no longer a matter of simple trade liberalization along nationalist 
lines, but a matter of production sharing and global supply chains.10 
Interdependence is a fact of global economic life. The facts of globalization 
seem beyond the comprehension of the ordinary citizen. Talk of offshoring 
and outsourcing jobs is becoming quaint, as it fails to capture the 
complexities of global production sharing, the global labor markets it 
requires, and the benefits and burdens it distributes. 
 Where do we go from here? We can understand and try to predict, if 
ever so generally, legal change. The table below provides a way to 
understand legal change, picturing for us the distinctions between changes 
in rules versus structure of institutions, evaluation of change from an 
internal versus an external perspective, and the distinction between the 
prescriptive and the descriptive or predictive.  
Structural Internal (values given) Prescriptive 
Rules External (critical) Descriptive/Predictive 
 The distinction between understanding legal change on the basis of rules 
versus structure lies in understanding the differences between these sorts of 
claims: “The rule on last substantial transformation as determinative of the 
origin of a good when more than one country is involved in the production 
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) 
were established. At Bretton Woods, countries agreed that a need existed for an 
intergovernmental organization to deal with international trade. An agreement was reached 
in Geneva in October 1947 on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. (GATT) and in 
March 1948, an agreement was reached in Havana on the International Trade Organization 
(ITO) Charter. The U.S. Congress foiled the ITO’s creation by repeatedly failing to 
approve U.S. entry into the ITO. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 23-28 (2nd ed. Oxford University Press)(overview of the negotiations and process). 
9 GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __. 
10 Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low, Introduction, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM:
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 2 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low eds. 
Cambridge University Press 2009). See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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of a good, as found in Article 9 of the WTO Rules of Origin Agreement,11 
will (or should) change to better reflect the nature of national contributions 
to products,” versus “rules of origin no longer do the work they were 
originally designed to do and broader concepts need to be developed to take 
the value of innovation into account.”12 An evaluation of legal change from 
an internal standpoint means that we take the values in the legal rules as 
unalterable givens and evaluate rules on the basis of coherence, certainty, 
predictability, completeness, and so on. An evaluation of legal change from 
an external standpoint means that we evaluate the values the legal rules 
reflect, possibly in addition to the things we evaluate when we evaluate 
from an internal perspective. For example, we might find from an internal 
evaluation that the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) requires an extensive system of patent protection but 
an external evaluation might find that requiring some developing countries 
to implement extensive patent protection is unfair or bad for their 
economies or societies.13 External evaluations are critical, which means 
they inquire whether the law might be justified from some criterion such as 
morality, justice, welfare, or efficiency. An evaluation of legal change from 
a descriptive or predictive standpoint is an attempt to determine the actual 
direction of the law. An evaluation of legal change from a prescriptive 
standpoint argues for a direction the law should or ought to take.  
 These evaluative tools often work together. For example, we may want 
to evaluate legal change from structural, external, and prescriptive 
standpoints. Or we may want to evaluate legal change from a rules, internal, 
and descriptive standpoint. Points in between these two extremes are also 
available to us. The analysis of variable geometry in part I below is 
structural, has elements of both the internal and the external, and is mainly 
prescriptive. The discussion of basic operating or “constitutional” principles 
beyond progressive trade liberalization, found in part II, is structural, 
external, and both descriptive and prescriptive. 
11  The WTO Rules of Origin Agreement may be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/roi e/roi e.htm (last visited March 6, 2011.  
12 For an example of the deficiencies in rules of origin analysis to understand international 
trade flows, see Andrew Batson, Not Really “Made in China:” The iPhone’s Complex 
Supply Chain Highlights Problems with Trade Statistics,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2010, at 
B1-B2. 
13 For an overview, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 437-40; 448-72 (3rd ed. Routledge 2005). 
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II. VARIABLE GEOMETRY
In the coming decades, one of the most important issues countries (and their 
populations) will likely confront is in what framework they will conduct 
most of their negotiations for trade agreements. Will the dominant model be 
multilateral or regional? For those of us who lived as trade lawyers through 
the Uruguay Round, the WTO has had a formative influence on us. If one 
were to survey international trade lawyers of a certain generation, you will 
basically hear, “it’s the WTO; is there anything else?” This perception of 
the state of affairs is rapidly changing, if it has not already changed, as the 
spaghetti bowl of regional trade agreements grows in size and complexity. 
The 2011 Obama Trade Agenda makes the case for continuing with the 
Doha Round but it also spends many pages explaining US regional and 
bilateral initiatives.14  
 The phrase “variable geometry” has developed to refer to situations in 
which a multilateral set of agreements exists, under some form of 
overarching organizational structure, but not all countries adhere to the 
same agreements the organizational structure covers.15 It is often a term 
used to refer to a way to move European Union enlargement forward.16 The 
European Union website defines “variable geometry Europe” to “describe 
the idea of a method of differentiated integration which acknowledges that 
there are irreconcilable differences within the integration structure and 
therefore allows for a permanent separation between a group of Member 
States and a number of less developed integration units.”17 
 There has been some recent discussion of applying variable geometry 
concepts to the WTO and its multilateral agreements, particularly because 
of the lack of movement in the Doha Round. Robert Lawrence’s “club-of-
clubs” approach for WTO reform18 was the subject of the January 2011 
discussions of the World Economic forum in Davos.19 The proposals are 
currently short on specifics, but appear to advocate the dismantling of the 
14  See 2011 Trade Policy Agenda and 2010 Annual Report, 
http://www.ustr.gov/2011 trade policy agenda (last visited March 8, 2011. 
15 See Mini-Symposium: The Future Geometry of WTO Law,” published at 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 775 (2006).  
16 The phrases “concentric circles” and “multi-speed Europe” are used to explain similar 
concepts. See J.A. Usher, Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles: Patterns for the 
European Union, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 243 (1997). 
17 http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/glossary/variable geometry europe en htm (last 
visited March 7, 2011). 
18 Robert Z. Lawrence, Rulemaking Amidst Growing Diversity: A Club-of-Clubs Approach 
to WTO Reform and New Issue Selection, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 823 (2006). 
19 GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __, at 67. 
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multilateral or single undertaking approach to WTO membership and 
ministerial round negotiations.  
 The club-of-clubs approach may be postulated with or without a single 
undertaking.20 There can be a set of plurilateral agreements with or without 
most favored nation obligations, or, alternatively stated, with conditional or 
unconditional most favored nation obligations.21 What countries would 
prefer depends on whether they care about free riding by countries who do 
not agree to specific plurilateral obligations yet still reap the benefits.22   
 A move towards plurilateralism may be seen as a move backwards from 
a WTO perspective, from Uruguay Round and on back to the Tokyo 
Round.23 The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is held 
out as an example of the right direction.24 This is ironic because the push 
has been towards making the GPA multilateral. The WTO and powerful 
WTO members have been trying to devise ways of broadening participation 
in the GPA. One such effort was the attempted move during the Doha 
Round to transform the plurilateral GPA into a multilateral framework 
agreement with fewer obligations and focusing on transparency in 
government procurement. 25  The work on transparency in government 
procurement is officially on hold.26 Another such effort was a revision of 
the GPA text, completed in December 2006, partly designed to provide 
20  Hoekman, supra note __, at 13-15. 
21 Id.; see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT AND WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 58-59 (Cambridge University Press 
2000)(distinguishing conditional from unconditional most favored nation obligations). 
22 Hoekman, supra note __, at 13. 
23 The WTO website summarizes the negotiating history of the Tokyo Round as it is 
traditionally understood: 
[A] series of agreements on non-tariff barriers did emerge from the 
negotiations, in some cases interpreting existing GATT rules, in others 
breaking entirely new ground. In most cases, only a relatively small 
number of (mainly industrialized) GATT members subscribed to these 
agreements and arrangements. Because they were not accepted by the full 
GATT membership, they were often informally called “codes”. 
They were not multilateral, but they were a beginning. Several codes 
were eventually amended in the Uruguay Round and turned into 
multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members. Only four 
remained “plurilateral” — those on government procurement, bovine 
meat, civil aircraft and dairy products. In 1997 WTO members agreed to 
terminate the bovine meat and dairy agreements, leaving only two. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact4 e htm (last visited March 8, 
2011). 
24 Lawrence, supra note __, at __; GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __ at __. 
25 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min03 e/brief e/brief09 e htm (last 
visited March 10, 2011). 
26 Id. 
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incentives to broaden participation, in particular by developing countries.27 
Finally, there has been a significant move to make GPA accession a 
condition for WTO accession, a move that makes the GPA close to being 
multilateral. Mandated GPA accession as a condition to WTO accession is 
especially critical for countries with large public procurement markets, such 
as China.28 The point here is not to outline events that have shaped the GPA 
but to inform the reader that many WTO members may be dissatisfied with 
having plurilateral agreements in the WTO system. To suggest a move 
away from multilateralism is a cut far away from the trend and conventional 
thinking about the WTO. The perception of plurilateralism as defeat may 
prove to be a significant obstacle to variable geometry in the WTO 
agreements. 
 Variable geometry, moreover, may be seen as already with us. It is 
currently accomplished through regionalism, outside the WTO but notified 
to the WTO.29 To date, 474 regional trade agreements have been notified to 
the WTO, with 283 in force.30 The variable geometry on the table right now 
may be seen as a move to simply internalize regionalism within the WTO 
structure. 
 The biggest obstacle to variable geometry at the WTO level is its 
potential difficulties in dealing with complex global problems in need of 
cooperation and compliance by significant numbers of countries. Variable 
geometry may work for some trade issues that have to do primarily with 
economics, such as tariffs, but there are hardly any of those left for 
advancing cooperation among countries. It could make linkage of trade and 
other issues, such as carbon taxes or labor standards more difficult to 




II. FROM VARIABLE GEOMETRY TO CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER? 
 
Clubs do not function without common values. 31  Three iterations or 
generations of values seem to be at work, or should be at work, in the world 
                                                
27 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/gproc e/negotiations e htm (last visited March 
10, 2011). 
28 See Ping Wang, China’s Accession to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement – 
Challenges and the Way Forward, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 663 (2009). 
29 351 regional trade agreements were notified to the WTO under GATT 1947/1994 Article 
XXIV, 31 under the Enabling Clause, and 92 under GATS Article V. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/region e htm (last visited March 10, 2011). 
30 Id. 
31 Values discussed at January 2011 World Economic Form, but the focus was almost 




trading system. The first is progressive trade liberalization, the second is 
production sharing, and the third should be justice. “Should be” not “is” is 
the right language for the third stage of values because justice ought to be a 
goal for the world trade order in the coming decade and decades to come, 
but it is by no means certain that it will be. In the schema of legal change 
identified above, the discussion to follow is mainly prescriptive, external, 
and structural, though we should not rule out the connection to the internal. 
Values are important to legal analysis of WTO and regional trade 
agreements. Attend any meeting of international trade lawyers, and the 
implicit premise underlying their analysis, a concept of constitutional 
magnitude, akin to liberty or equality in domestic constitutional law, has 
been the idea of progressive trade liberalization, and now production 
sharing.  
 Given the limits on the scope of this essay, what follows is only a brief 
sketch of some of the issues relating to values in the world trading system. 
The focus will be on justice, but nothing like a comprehensive justification 
of the argument for justice as an operating or constitutional principle for 
international economic institutions. I would refer the reader to just a 
sampling of the recent literature on global justice, not all cosmopolitan in 
approach, some in fact liberal nationalist in approach, but all of which argue 
that justice is not simply a national or domestic concern.32 
                                                                                                                       
Faith” in GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __, at 229; John DeGioia, Creating a Values 
Framework, in GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __, at 443. The exclusive focus on religious 
morality ignores the vast literature on global justice in moral and political philosophy. See 
infra note __ for a selective sampling of very recent literature. 
32 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACH (Harvard University Press 2011); IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 2011); RICHARD W. MILLER, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: THE 
ETHICS OF POVERTY AND POWER (Oxford University Press 2010); THOMAS POGGE, 
POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE PRO-POOR RHETORIC (Polity 2010); GILLIAN 
BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT (Oxford University Press 2009); 
DARREL MOELLENDORF, GLOBAL INEQUALITY MATTERS (Palgrave Macmillan 2009); 
DENIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER: THE EVOLVING 
STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE (Cambridge University Press 2008); DAVID MILLER, 
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 2007); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY & SPECIES 
MEMBERSHIP (Harvard University Press 2006); GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES: ACHIEVING GLOBAL JUSTICE (Christian Barry & Thomas W. Pogge eds. 
Blackwell 2005); CURRENT DEBATES IN GLOBAL JUSTICE (Gillian Brock & Darrel 
Moellendorf eds. Springer 2005); SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL 
POLITICAL THEORY (Oxford University Press 2005); ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, 
LEGITIMACY, AND SELF DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Oxford University Press 2004); THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND THE DISTANT 
NEEDY (Deen K. Chatterjee ed. Cambridge University Press 2004); KOK-CHOR TAN, 
JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM 
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 When the GATT started out in 1947, the aim of the GATT Contracting 
Parties was trade liberalization, mainly for tariffs. This was accomplished 
through successive rounds of trade negotiations33 The operating principle 
for these trade negotiating rounds was progressive trade liberalization, 
structured around the political influence of producers in national 
governments and the power of governments in trade negotiations. As Paul 
Krugman explains, “[i]f economists ruled the world, there would be no need 
for a World Trade Organization. The economist’s case for free trade is 
essentially a unilateral case – that is, it says that a country serves its own 
interests by pursuing free trade regardless of what other countries may 
do. . . . Fortunately or unfortunately, the world is not ruled by economists. 
The compelling economic case for unilateral free trade carries hardly any 
weight among people who really matter.”34 Krugman elaborates: “Anyone 
who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations eventually 
realizes that they can only be understood by realizing that they are a game 
scored by mercantilist rules, in which an increase in exports – no matter 
how expensive to produce in terms of opportunities foregone – is a victory, 
and an increase in imports – no matter how may resources it releases for 
other uses – is a defeat.”35 What happens in trade negotiations is governed 
by politics. Governments want to close markets in which their country lacks 
comparative advantage and open markets in which it does. The result is 
global markets for goods and services that cannot be described as “free” but 
in which the legal rules of the game are ever so important in determining 
the market for particular goods and services. 
 The progressive liberalization operating principle could be said to have 
transformed into a production-sharing norm after the Uruguay Round. As 
Baldwin and Low explain: 
This is a world in which production processes are spread 
through multiple jurisdictions across the world. The political 
economy effects of this fragmentation have been significant 
– blunting the old distinctions between “us” and “them” that 
use to drive trade policy. Producer interests that previously 
                                                                                                                       
(Cambridge University Press 2004). My apologies to any authors and their works I have 
omitted. I have not included the recent human rights/international trade literature, which is 
also vast. A crass commercial message for my own work: GLOBAL JUSTICE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW; OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (Chi Carmody, Frank 
Garcia, & John Linarelli eds., Cambridge University Press forthcoming 2011). I am also at 
work as editor on RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW, to be published by Edward Elgar. 
33 LOWENFELD, supra note __, at 48-71. 
34 Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 113 
(1997). 




sought to protect their local markets from outsiders now 
worry about market access conditions and trade costs in a 
range of other markets as well. Hence the growing political 
economy forces that favor more open markets.36 
Two results (and no doubt more) are likely to derive from this shift to a 
production sharing norm. First, in the drive to open markets to facilitate 
production sharing, producers lobby national governments to open more 
markets. If the WTO process fails to deliver, regional arrangements are 
sought. Second, producer interests are now more disconnected with citizen 
interests than ever before, if they were ever aligned very much to begin with, 
even in the era of the progressive trade liberalization norm. We are in a time 
of the state-less multinational enterprises. But the politicians, subject to the 
usual public choice ills, still promote the interests of these enterprises as if 
their interests aligned with the interests of the polity and its citizens.   
 The result is that the international economic order, as a legal system or 
legal order, is seriously disordered. The basic operating principle for 
deciding the values or interests trade agreements should promote is that of 
the multinational enterprise. Those values are decided upon essentially by 
national governments even though the interest of multinational enterprises 
are decidedly not national in their scope and indeed are sometimes contrary 
to national interests. Whether the interests of multinational enterprises align 
with those of citizens, labor, and consumers is really quite accidental, and 
often in conflict.   
 There has been a good deal written about whether the WTO or the world 
trading system is a constitutional order.37 It clearly is not.38 Constitutions 
serve a number of purposes that the WTO or any set of international 
economic institutions, even if considered together, were not conceived to 
deal with. I will try to sketch out very briefly some of the important features 
of constitutions. Among other features, constitutions resolve moral 
disagreements among citizens. For example, American constitutional law 
on the conditions for permissibility of abortions attempts to resolve a moral 
disagreement that has divided Americans.39 Constitutions set the terms for 
equality among citizens in a polity. For example, American constitutional 
                                                
36 Baldwin & Low, supra note __, at 2. 
37 A recent and influential work in the area is RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman 
eds. Cambridge University Press 2009). 
38 Dunoff’s contribution is particularly elucidating about the lack of constitutional structure 
in the WTO. Jeffrey Dunoff, The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious Case 
of the World Trade Organization, in id., at 178. 
39 See Georgia Warnke, Interpretive Differences and the Abortion Debate, in GEORGIA 
WARNKE, LEGITIMATE DIFFERENCES: INTERPRETATION IN THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 
AND OTHER PUBLIC DEBATES 82 (University of California Press 1999). 
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law on standards for judicial review of legislation discriminating on 
grounds of race, gender and economic categories are among the areas of 
constitutional law setting the terms of equality in American society. 
Constitutions respect and enforce identity claims of various groups in a 
society, usually through recognition of liberty claims, thereby protecting the 
ethical independence of each person.40 Constitutions provide for peaceful 
participation of citizens in governance. Finally, they liberalize international 
markets within countries, and in particular in countries that have adopted a 
federalist structure of government. The WTO does none of these things save 
one: liberalize markets. Perhaps even more significantly, the WTO is built 
on the wrong lexical priority for what might be seen as proper constitutional 
value system: economic power and economic efficiency trump rights and 
justice. In a constitutional order, justice has primacy, not efficiency or 
power. For example, in a domestic constitutional order, basic human rights 
trump (or should trump) internal market liberalization. No one could 
plausibly claim that efficient trafficking of slaves trumps the right of all 
persons to be free, an extreme example, but it makes the point. In the world 
trading system it is the reverse, and human rights concerns are often seen as 
illicit or inappropriate for international economic law. This is so even 
though trade rules now go beyond the border, to the regulatory autonomy of 
a state, the core of domestic constitutional order.41 This wrong priority of 
values is a symptom of disorder.   
 My point here is not to set up the WTO as a straw person. The WTO 
was created with limited purposes. It was not set up to be a constitutional 
order. It cannot be asked to do what it was not designed to do.  
 Rather, the point is to suggest that what is needed in the coming decade 
and thereafter is reform of global economic institutions generally, including 
trade institutions, something in the nature of constitutional reform. All of 
the global economic institutions “taken together,” according to philosopher 
Charles Bietz, “can be considered as the constitutional structure of the 
world economy; their activities have important distributive implications.”42  
40 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) is an example. The term “ethical independence 
is from RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 368-71 (Harvard University Press 
2011). The term reflects the well-accepted distinction between morality, which has to do 
with duties to others, and ethics, which has to do with living a good life. RONALD 
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 211, 485 n. 1 
(Harvard University Press 2000). 
41 See Joel P. Trachtman, Developing Countries, The Doha Round, Preferences, and the 
Right to Regulate, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 111, 117
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds. Oxford University Press 2009)(on the “right to 
regulate” of a WTO member). 
42  CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 148-49
(Princeton University Press 1979). 
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They form a basic structure of global society.43 Consider the following three 
features of the global economic order and ask what values they should be 
built upon to have legitimacy to most people. First, global economic 
institutions affect life prospects in dramatic ways.44 They affect benefits and 
burdens people are expected to accept. They substantially affect poverty and 
inequality. The rules are often designed to make the rich richer and the poor 
poorer. 45  Second, multinational enterprises benefit from inequality. 
Production sharing means that products can be reduced to components that 
can be made anywhere in the world where labor is cheapest, safety 
standards are lowest, and environmental standards the most lax. Intra-
industry and intra-firm trade comprises a larger percentage of trade flows 
than ever before.46 Third the world is interdependent, in substantial part 
because of global economic institutions. National borders do not 
realistically determine the limits of social cooperation.47 As Beitz explains, 
“international interdependence involves a complex and substantial pattern 
of social interaction which produces benefits and burdens that would not 
exist if national economies were autarkic.”48 In any such scheme of social 
cooperation, it is difficult to argue that justice should not be required for 
these institutional arrangements to have legitimacy.  
CONCLUSION 
There are so many ways I could have approached this essay. I could have 
focused solely on the internal, on changes in rules in the coming decades, 
such as on the work on the WTO built-in agenda, or on a synthesis of the 
rules of regional trade agreements. WTO accession is a significant topic, 
which I have ignored. My aim was to focus on two basic questions. One of 
those questions is existential: what is to be of the WTO and world trade 
institutions generally? This is the discussion of variable geometry. The 
other question I focused on goes to the core values of the world trading 
system: what should trade agreements do? Should they take questions of 
43 See, e.g., Tan, supra note __, at 21. Tan is not the only source for this point. 
44 Tan, supra note __, at 27-29. 
45 OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE
FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY (Oxfam 2002), 
http://www maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=03042002121618 htm (last visited March 
11, 2011); see also http://www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/trade/rigged rules (last visited 
March 11, 2011). 
46 OECD data. 
47 Beitz, supra note __, at 149. 
48 Id. 
REDESIGNING GLOBAL TRADE INSTITUTIONS 12 
distributive justice into account? These two questions, I think, will, or 
perhaps should, have some play in the decade to come, and beyond. 
